The 9/11 Commission Report

List of Illustrations and Tables

Member List

Staff List

Preface

1. “WE HAVE SOME PLANES”

• 1.1 Inside the Four Flights
• 1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense
• 1.3 National Crisis Management

2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM

• 2.1 A Declaration of War
• 2.2 Bin Ladin’s Appeal in the Islamic World
• 2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992)
• 2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992–1996)
• 2.5 Al Qaeda’s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998)

3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES

• 3.1 From the Old Terrorism to the New: The First World Trade Center Bombing
• 3.2 Adaptation—and Nonadaptation—in the Law Enforcement Community
• 3.3 . . . and in the Federal Aviation Administration
• 3.4 . . . and in the Intelligence Community
• 3.5 . . . and in the State Department and the Defense Department
• 3.6 . . . and in the White House
• 3.7 . . . and in the Congress

4. RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS

• 4.1 Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania
• 4.2 Crisis: August 1998
• 4.3 Diplomacy
• 4.4 Covert Action
• 4.5 Searching for Fresh Options

5. AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND

• 5.1 Terrorist Entrepreneurs
• 5.2 The “Planes Operation”
• 5.3 The Hamburg Contingent
• 5.4 A Money Trail?

6. FROM THREAT TO THREAT

• 6.1 The Millennium Crisis
• 6.2 Post-Crisis Reflection: Agenda for 2000
• 6.3 The Attack on the USS Cole
• 6.4 Change and Continuity
• 6.5 The New Administration’s Approach

7. THE ATTACK LOOMS

• 7.1 First Arrivals in California
• 7.2 The 9/11 Pilots in the United States
• 7.3 Assembling the Teams
• 7.4 Final Strategies and Tactics

8. “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED”

• 8.1 The Summer of Threat
• 8.2 Late Leads—Mihdhar, Moussaoui, and KSM

9. HEROISM AND HORROR

• 9.1 Preparedness as of September 11
• 9.2 September 11, 2001
• 9.3 Emergency Response at the Pentagon 311
• 9.4 Analysis

10. WARTIME

• 10.1 Immediate Responses at Home
• 10.2 Planning for War
• 10.3 “Phase Two” and the Question of Iraq

11. FORESIGHT—AND HINDSIGHT

• 11.1 Imagination
• 11.2 Policy
• 11.3 Capabilities
• 11.4 Management

12. WHAT TO DO? A GLOBAL STRATEGY

• 12.1 Reflecting on a Generational Challenge
• 12.2 Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations
• 12.3 Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism
• 12.4 Protect against and Prepare for Terrorist Attacks

13. HOW TO DO IT? A DIFFERENT WAY OF ORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT

• 13.1 Unity of Effort across the Foreign-Domestic Divide
• 13.2 Unity of Effort in the Intelligence Community
• 13.3 Unity of Effort in Sharing Information
• 13.4 Unity of Effort in the Congress
• 13.5 Organizing America’s Defenses in the United States

Appendix A: Common Abbreviations

Appendix B:Table of Names

Appendix C: Commission Hearings

Notes